Optimizely hack put card-skimming code in scripts on Australian finance and telco websites

An attacker abused a flaw in Optimizely's testing service on 16 November to plant card-skimming and crypto-stealing code in scripts used by 178 organisations, including HSBC Australia, Rest Super and Vodafone Australia. Boards should know who can change the code on their websites, and how fast.

Optimizely hack put card-skimming code in scripts on Australian finance and telco websites

An attacker abused a flaw in Optimizely's website testing service on 16 November to slip malicious code into scripts that Australian finance and telco brands load on their websites. Report URI researchers found the code in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets checked, belonging to 178 organisations. The Australian sites on its list include HSBC Australia, Rest Super, Betashares, Vodafone Australia and TPG Telecom. A listing does not show that visitors were exposed or that a company's own systems were breached.

Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a weakness in its account signup flow, posed as users of targeted accounts and inserted JavaScript into their projects. It says fewer than 5 per cent of customers were affected, it was not a credentials breach and no other product was involved. It says it closed the flaw within three hours and has contacted every Web Experimentation customer. Report URI saw the first injection at 3:21pm AEDT on 16 November and found every infected file clean by 10:11am the next day.

Report URI says the code was built to capture card details typed into web forms, swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses and steer unpatched iPhones and iPads towards exploit kits. It counted about US$7,040 paid into the attacker's crypto wallets by 6:25am AEDT on 17 November, on-chain receipts only and not a verified loss total.

TPG Telecom, owner of Vodafone Australia, found no evidence that Vodafone systems or customer data were compromised, noting the affected pages had no payment or login functions, and has paused Optimizely. HSBC said in a statement that unauthorised scripts were not active on its websites. Report URI says the bank's Content Security Policy blocked the data theft, although a backup copy of the code still ran.

The investigation has also widened: StorifyMe, a supplier of embeddable website widgets, has confirmed that unauthorised JavaScript reached some of its customers' web integrations. Researchers first saw poisoned StorifyMe and Kissmetrics responses on 13 November (UTC), three days before the Optimizely wave; a capture of the Sydney Morning Herald's site a day later held one. Report URI links that earlier wave to the same actor; other researchers say the cases share infrastructure but have not established a common operator, and no group has been named.

Why does it matter?

The code was served through scripts loaded on the customer-facing websites of a bank, a super fund, an ETF issuer and a major telco, none of which wrote it. Visa's latest Biannual Threats Report points to the same weak spot across payments: from January to June 2026, attacks on third-party providers and agents accounted for about 56 per cent of compromised card numbers in Visa's figures. CNC argued in October that attackers increasingly reach banks through peripheral services rather than core systems. Marketing and testing tags fit that description.

"The next evolution of fraud will be won or lost upstream." - Michael Jabbara, Senior Vice President and Global Head of Payment Ecosystem Risk and Control, Visa

Security teams should list every third-party script on customer-facing pages, especially login and payment pages, and confirm who can change each one. Report URI advises Optimizely customers to review project JavaScript and experiment code, check who has write access and rotate credentials. A restrictive Content Security Policy with reporting on is a useful backstop: Report URI, which sells tools to detect such attacks, says one blocked the payload on 24 sites it examined. Anyone who typed card details into an affected site's own form between about 3pm on 16 November and 10am the next day (AEDT) should check their statements; cards entered in hosted payment frames were out of reach, Report URI says.

Boards should ask whether they would know within hours if a supplier's script changed, and who would tell customers. Still unknown are how many Australians received the code, whether any cards were compromised, and whether any affected Australian organisation has notified the OAIC or ASD's ACSC. CNC found no public statement from either agency.


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